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Constitutional Law, Social Justice and the 
Redistribution of Land  
 
Tom Allen 
I. Introduction 
This chapter examines the interplay between human rights, constitutional law, the 
compulsory redistribution of land and the forces of globalisation. Rural poverty and gross 
inequality seem to compel state intervention in land ownership, and yet a strong right to 
property can entrench the very interests that governments wish to challenge. This is 
especially acute in the developing world, where a right to full compensation for land taken for 
redistribution can make it financially impossible for governments to take significant action. 
This chapter therefore concentrates on two states — India and the Philippines — where 
politicians and judges have frequently dealt with the tension between the egalitarianism and 
relief of poverty, on one side, and the right to property on the other. In both countries, 
promises of redistribution and agrarian reform have been part of political life since World 
War II, if not before. At one time, such promises were very much the norm for post-colonial 
nations.
1
 Many hoped that implementing promises of ‘land to the tiller’ would address both 
inequality and poverty, and that compulsion would be necessary for meaningful action. 
However, in recent decades, most states have moved away from redistribution. In the 
Philippines, the national programme of land acquisition that was initiated in 1987 is drawing 
to a close; in India, there is even less activity. Yet, in both countries, the level of inequality in 
the distribution of land remains high and success has been only partial, at best. 
                                                 
1
 See generally, M Lipton, Land Reform in Developing Countries: Property Rights and Property Wrongs 
(Oxford, Routledge, 2009); P Krugman, ‘Inequality and Redistribution’ in N Serra and JE Stiglitz (eds), The 
Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008).   
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In these countries, land reform has featured in constitutional law, both in specific 
provisions and as a key consideration in the framing of rights to property. The courts in both 
countries have produced rich jurisprudence on the interpretation of relevant constitutional 
clauses. From independence, the highest courts in India and the Philippines maintained a 
requirement of full compensation for land taken for redistribution (and other purposes). There 
have been interludes where the courts allowed greater flexibility but, as this chapter 
demonstrates, the general trend is for full compensation. The impact on the cost of 
redistribution has made it more difficult to implement reform, and helps to explain why the 
achievement is less than anticipated. Indeed, the Indian and Philippine record on 
redistribution contrasts sharply with that of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.
2
 These countries 
carried out the most comprehensive post-World War II programmes for land reform and 
redistribution in Asia (leaving aside the socialist nations). Moreover, as in India and the 
Philippines, land redistribution was implemented through the use of legal powers of 
compulsory acquisition, rather than consensual, market-led reform or the confiscatory 
methods of the socialist governments. However, the cost of compensation was significantly 
lower: in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, compensation was based on the value of rents or 
crop yields, and generally fell well below market values. As explained below, proposals for 
such compensation standards were brought forward in India and the Philippines. However, 
they were either dismissed before they could be implemented, or they were subject to 
constitutional challenges that restored the market standard. Arguably, these constitutional 
                                                 
2
 See generally J Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London, Catholic 
Institute for International Relations, 1992) 101–05; J-S You, ‘Inequality and Corruption: The Role of Land 
Reform in Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines’ Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Atlanta, 
Georgia, 3–6 April 2008; H-C Tai, Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis (London, University of 
California Press, 1974); on each country, see NL Nathanson, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Japan’ (1958) 7 
American Journal of Comparative Law 195; A YC Koo, The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: A 
Cast Study of Taiwan (New York, Praeger, 1968); Y-D Jeon and Y-Y Kim, ‘Land Reform, Income 
Redistribution, and Agricultural Production in Korea’ (2000) 48 Economic Development and Cultural Change 
253, 254–58. 
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differences had the effect of making extensive land redistribution far more difficult to 
achieve.  
 Of course, factors other than compensation have been important. External forces have 
played a crucial role: it is worth noting, for example, that the United States supported 
redistribution in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.
3
 Both the American and the national 
governments were fearful that, without land reform, the peasants would support communist 
insurgencies. In India, the United States had less influence, and in any case the communist 
threat was much weaker. However, in the Philippines, where American influence has been 
greater, the focus has been on military action, rather than social measures aimed at winning 
over the rural peasantry. More recently, the World Bank urged the Philippine government to 
abandon its programme of compulsory redistribution in favour of market-led, voluntary 
transfers.
4
  
Whilst external forces are undoubtedly important, this chapter concentrates on the 
internal forces of globalisation, and in particular on the tendency of judges to frame their 
reasons for supporting full compensation by reference to comparative law. The chapter 
demonstrates that, so far as the judges are concerned, comparative law has almost invariably 
pointed them in the direction of the liberal model of state power and property. By this view, 
the right to property is an integral element of personal liberty: the rights of property describe 
a part of individual autonomy that deserves the same level of protection as (for example) 
                                                 
3
 Putzel, ibid 96–99, 127–37, 283–303 (Putzel also discusses the World Bank’s brief period of support for more 
radical reforms: ibid, 287–90); SM Borras Jr, D Carranza Jr, C Franco and MA Manahan, Anti-Land Reform 
Land Policy?: The World Bank’s Development Assistance to Agrarian Reform in the Philippines, 
focusweb.org/sites/www.focusweb.org/files/WORLDBANK-Boras-Carranza-Franco-Manahan.pdf, 9–12. 
4
 Borras et al, ibid. An extensive literature examines the relationships between the national laws on the 
protection of property and international capital flows: See eg DS Law and M Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and 
Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 California Law Review 1163; DS Law, ‘Globalization and the 
Future of Constitutional Rights’ (2007) 102 Northwestern University Law Review 1277; DA Farber, ‘Rights as 
Signals’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 83; M Tushnet, ‘The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional 
Law’ (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 985; R Dixon and EA Posner, ‘The Limits of 
Constitutional Convergence’ (2010–2011) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 399; T Moustafa, ‘Law 
versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt’ (2003) 28  Law & Social Inquiry 883, 885. 
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rights to freedom of expression and conscience.
5
 This is not to say that property is immune 
from expropriation in the public interest. However, where this does occur, the owner has no 
obligation to shoulder a greater part of the burden of serving the public interest than any other 
citizen. In constitutional and human rights law, this is expressed through provisions that 
guarantee full compensation for the compulsory acquisition of property. This ensures that the 
owner suffers no economic loss beyond the additional tax burden in funding compensation 
that falls on all citizens.   
This has had two main doctrinal implications. First, the courts of India and the 
Philippines have generally interpreted constitutional property clauses as requiring full 
compensation for taking, even where there is some doubt that the plain language or original 
intention would justify such a reading. Second, in cases related to property, the courts have 
given little to no weight to constitutional provisions on social justice, egalitarianism and land 
reform. In the Philippines, the result is that redistribution cannot proceed unless the 
landowners are paid full compensation for their land. In effect, the option of providing below-
market compensation, as in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, has not been available. The 
situation in India is more complex: the right to property normally requires full compensation, 
but it does allow exceptions. Moreover, there are recognised mechanisms by which the 
legislature may narrow the scope of judicial review. Nevertheless, the ideology of property 
remains liberal.  
The chapter begins by considering the framing of constitutional rights to property in 
each country at independence, and the subsequent rise of the liberal interpretation of 
compensation guarantees. It then follows the weakening of the liberal position through the 
1970s and 1980s before considering the revival of the liberal model in more recent years. 
                                                 
5
 See RA Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1985).  
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Throughout, it shows how comparative law has been utilised to justify support for the liberal 
model. It closes with an examination of the comparative methodology of the courts, by asking 
whether it is a form of judicial learning from comparator models, a type of signalling (and if 
so, the intended audience), or a means of legitimating socially conservative judgments 
intended to support a landed elite. 
As this collection concentrates on human rights and property, it may appear that a 
chapter on constitutional law is out of place. However, the judicial analysis of the right to 
property under international human rights law, especially that of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, is very similar to that of constitutional law in these countries. In practical 
terms, the rights to property in the constitutional law of India and the Philippines provide a 
similar constraint on state power as the right contained in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention. Indeed, the Indian Supreme Court has increasingly referred to the judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights on the European right to property in its constitutional 
jurisprudence.
6
 It is not surprising that this is the case: in Europe, India and the Philippines, 
the rights to property — constitutional or international — are treated as safeguards of 
individual freedom and human dignity in the face of state power. Hence, for this collection, it 
makes sense to concentrate on the national jurisprudence of constitutional property rights 
when seeking to identify global trends on human rights and property. 
II. Liberal, Socialist and Social Democrat Constitutional Theories at 
Independence  
Liberal views on land ownership had a strong influence on the framing of the colonial 
constitutions of both India and the Philippines. In India, as in England itself, questions were 
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 See eg KT Plantation Pvt Ltd v State of Karnataka [2011] 13 (ADDL) SCR 636 [85].  
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frequently raised over the legitimacy of land laws that allowed and sustained the 
concentration of holdings.
7
 In much of India, these patterns of concentrated ownership were 
created by the British.
 8
 In the late eighteenth century, the British East India Company sought 
to create a landholding system that would secure it a satisfactory level of income and, ideally, 
provide incentives for the further development of agriculture. Their solution lay in the 
creation of a near-feudal system of tenure, under which a group of tax collectors and 
administrators were allocated territory over which they had the right to set and collect rents 
from tenants. In exchange, they were required to make a fixed annual payment to the 
Company. This arrangement, known as the Permanent Settlement of 1793, effectively 
transformed the tax collectors, or ‘zamindars’, into private owners of extensive tracts of land. 
The system did not apply throughout the country, and by the early nineteenth century the 
British had decided not to extend it to the remaining parts of India under their jurisdiction. It 
became increasingly unpopular through the twentieth century, with growing demands for 
tenancy reform or outright abolition of the system. However, the zamindars supported British 
rule, and hence the British were reluctant to embark on reforms that would diminish their 
property rights. This was demonstrated in 1934: the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Indian 
Constitutional Reform rejected Indian demands for a bill of rights whilst recommending a 
right to property ‘in order to quiet doubts which have been aroused in recent years by certain 
Indian utterances’.9 These proposals were incorporated in the Government of India Act, 
                                                 
7
 See generally I Packer and L George, Liberalism and the Land: The Land Issue and Party Politics in England, 
1906–1914 (London, Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series, 2001); A Offer, Property and 
Politics, 1870–1914: Landownership, Law, Ideology, and Urban Development in England (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
8
 PK Agrawal, Land Reforms in India: Constitutional and Legal Approach (with Special Reference to Uttar 
Pradesh) (New Delhi, MD Publications, 1993) 1–18; HCL Merillat, Land and the Constitution in India (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1970) ch 1.  
9
 The Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional 
Reform (1934), Vol 1, Pt 1, para 366. See also Merillat, ibid, and T Allen, The Right to Property in 
Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 43–46. 
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1935.
10
 By expressing the constitutional issue in terms of property, rather than political or 
social power, a special status was reserved for a group of landowners whose claim to 
ownership and influence was coming under attack. 
The use of constitutional law to support a landed elite was also found in the 
Philippines. The United States took over the Philippines from Spain under the Treaty of Paris 
(1898), but without the intention of making it a colony on a permanent basis. It became a 
Commonwealth in 1935 and fully independent in 1946. When the United States took power, 
the Catholic Church owned most of the private land, with tenant farmers in a position of 
servitude.
11
 The territorial government intended to redistribute land, and indeed it acquired 
lands held by the Church for this purpose. However, to cover the cost of acquisition, it 
offered the land for resale at prices that most tenant farmers could not afford. Consequently, 
the concentration of holdings remained, although with a different group of owners. The 
United States then made it very difficult for Philippine governments to give serious 
consideration to further acquisitions for redistribution, as it entrenched property rights in the 
constitution of the territory. Section 5 of the Philippines Bill of 1902,
12
 which set up the 
territorial government, included the due process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution:  ‘no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein 
                                                 
10
 Government of India Act, 1935, s 299. The key provisions required legislation to state the principles on which 
compensation would be determined (s 299(2)), and also required prior sanction of the Governor General or 
Governor for the introduction of such legislation in the legislature (s 299(3)).  
11
 See Putzel  (n 2) 43–66 and WG Wolters, ‘The Development of Property Rights to Land in the Philippines, 
1850–1930’ in Toon van Meijl and Franz von Benda-Beckmann (eds), Property Rights and Economic 
Development: Land and Resources in Southeast Asia and Oceania (London and New York, Kegan Paul 
International, 1999)  110, 113–38 for the history of land ownership under the territorial government and before; 
see also JM Riedinger, Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995); TM Hanstad, ‘Philippine Land Reform: The Just Compensation 
Issue’ (1988) 63  Washington Law Review 417; ALA Martin, ‘Philippine Land Reform Cycles: Perpetuating US 
Colonial Policy’ (1999) 47 Philippine Studies 181. 
12
 See generally EM Fernando, ‘An Asian Perspective on the American Constitutional Influence in Asia: Its 
Impact on the Philippine Legal System’ (1976) 18 Malaya Law Review 281.  
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the equal protection of the laws’. The Fifth Amendment also incorporates the ‘takings 
clause’, which adds the provision ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation’ to the due process clause. Under American law, the due process clause 
only provides protection in respect of the procedural aspects of an interference with property. 
The takings clause guarantees ‘just compensation’. Crucially, this only applies to ‘takings’; in 
broad terms, an American ‘taking’ is equivalent to a compulsory acquisition of property 
under British law.  
At first glance, the omission of the takings clause from the Philippines Bill would 
appear to be a significant matter. However, section 63 of the Bill delegated the power of 
eminent domain to the Government of the Philippines (under American law, the power to 
compulsorily acquire property is known as the power of eminent domain). Section 74 then 
provided that the Government could further delegate the power of eminent domain, but only 
subject to the condition ‘That no private property shall be taken for any purpose under this 
section without just compensation paid or tendered therefor’. Subsequently, the Philippine 
Autonomy Act of 1916 repeated the property provisions of the 1902 Bill, and added a takings 
clause based on the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment.
13
 All the subsequent 
constitutions (1935, 1973 and 1987, excluding the Japanese occupation) include both due 
process and takings clauses.
14
  
The colonial constitutions of both countries therefore ensured that the dependent 
legislatures had the power to acquire and redistribute land, whilst providing constitutional 
protection for the special status of a small class of landowners. Independence therefore 
provided an opportunity to reconsider the constitutional position of property in both 
                                                 
13
 S 3; s 28 included the clause regarding delegation of the power of eminent domain. 
14
 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1935, Art III, s 1.1 and 1.2; Constitution of the Republic of 
the Philippines, 1973, Art IV, s 1, s 2; Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987, Art III, s 1, s 9. 
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jurisdictions, especially in relation to compensation on expropriation. However, this only 
occurred in India. In the Philippines, the process for achieving independence was set up by 
the Philippine Independence Act of 1934.
15
 The Act authorised a convention to draft a 
proposed constitution for approval by the President of the United States. Approval would not 
be given unless the Act included a bill of rights.
16
 Not only did the Convention’s proposal 
include the due process and takings clauses, but it added a new section 4: ‘The Congress may 
authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided 
into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals’. The proposed text was certified by 
President Roosevelt on 23 March 1935.  
The new Constitution came into effect at a crucial point in American history. The 
legislative programme of President Roosevelt’s New Deal was in progress, but many aspects 
were subject to constitutional challenge. In a line of cases including the famous Lochner v 
New York (1905), the Supreme Court of the United States invoked the Bill of Rights, 
including the Fifth Amendment, to strike down social legislation as an interference with 
liberty.
17
 The New Deal reflected the social democrat belief that human dignity was at stake 
in periods of economic crisis, and that the protection of human rights could require active 
intervention in markets.
18
 Plainly, this challenged narrower characterisation of individual 
freedom and liberalism in the form expressed in Lochner. In the Philippines, President 
Quezon also sought to enact legislation in pursuit of social justice, not unlike President 
Roosevelt.
19
 However, the constitutional concerns were similar: in People v Pomar, the 
                                                 
15
 Public Law 73–127 (1934; US); see generally Fernando (n 12). 
16
 Public Law 73–127, s 3.  
17
 Lochner v New York (1905) 198 US 45; S Choudhry, ‘The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism’ 
(2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1.  
18
 See S Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
19
 Putzel (n 2) 57–59. 
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Philippine Supreme Court followed Lochner and related cases.
20 
 In both countries, the 
majority of cases concerned labour laws and the contracts clause of the Bill of Rights, rather 
than the right to property. Nevertheless, the Lochner jurisprudence came to be regarded, both 
within the United States and internationally, as an illustration of the potential impact of the 
constitutional protection of property on legislative programmes for social and economic 
change.
21
 The liberal doctrines of the Lochner line of cases were coming under challenge 
when the 1935 Constitution was approved, but would not be reversed until West Coast Hotel 
Co v Parrish (1937)
22
  and United States v Carolene Products (1938).
23
 Given the potential 
obstacle of the Lochner/Pomar doctrines, the framers of the 1935 Constitution added a 
‘Declaration of Principles’ on social justice. Section 5 provided that ‘The promotion of social 
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern 
of the State’.  
Plainly, the Constitution of the United States has no provision corresponding to 
section 5, and it was uncertain how it would be received by the Philippine Supreme Court. 
Oddly, section 5 first arose as an argument for the continuation of the Lochner doctrine. In 
Calalang v Williams (1940),
24
 the petitioner argued that a restriction on use of animal-drawn 
carts in Manila was unconstitutional because it affected his economic well-being and 
therefore it did not promote social justice. Laurel J rejected the argument, stating that social 
justice reflects ‘the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, 
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest 
                                                 
20
 People v Pomar (1924) GR No L-22008: The Philippine Supreme Court applied American cases on due 
process to strike down legislation on maternity leave. 
21
 Choudhry (n 17). 
22
 West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish (1979) 300 US 379. 
23
 United States v Carolene Products (1938) 304 US 144. 
24
 Calalang v Williams (1940) 70 Phil 726, GR No 47800. 
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number”’.25 In other cases of that period on the relationship between constitutional law and 
economic policy, the Court did not even raise section 5, but preferred to rely on the American 
jurisprudence.
26
 
At this time, alternatives to the liberal ideology were being put forward in the Indian 
debates on property and land reform. The Constituent Assembly convened on 9 December 
1946; the Constitution was agreed on 26 November 1949 and took effect on 26 January 
1950.
27
 The Indian National Congress (‘Congress’), which held the majority of seats, had 
traditionally emphasised liberal ideas of individual liberty and equality. As early as 1928, in 
the report of the Committee Appointed by the All Parties’ Conference (‘Nehru Report’), 
Congress put forward constitutional principles for self-government, with a declaration of 
fundamental rights.
28
 The declaration included a right to property: Recommendation 4(ii) 
provided that ‘No person shall be deprived of his liberty nor shall his dwelling or property be 
entered, sequestered or confiscated, save in accordance with law.’ Other aspects of the Report 
also reflected the interests of the zamindars, as it rejected the inclusion of tenancy rights.
29
 In 
addition, it reassured investors that ‘It is inconceivable that there can be any discriminating 
legislation against any community doing business lawfully in India’.30 Overall, it appeared 
that Congress would do little to challenge the landed interests.  
                                                 
25
 ibid, 734. 
26
 See Leyte Land Transportation Company, Inc v Leyte Farmer's and Laborer's Union (1948) GR No L-1377; 
Antamok Goldfields Mining Company v Court of Industrial Relations (1940) GR No L-46892. 
27
 G Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966) 84–99; 
G Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: A History of the Indian Experience (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003); Merillat (n 8); HCL Merillat, ‘The Indian Constitution: Property Rights and Social Reform’ (1960) 
21 Ohio State Law Journal 616. 
28
 Committee Appointed by the All Parties’ Conference 1928, The Nehru Report: An Anti-Separatist Manifesto 
(New Delhi, Michiko & Panjathan, 1928 reprinted 1975).  
29
 ibid, 90. 
30
 ibid, 11.  
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The situation changed within a short period. By the 1930s, it was obvious that 
Congress would not win popular support unless it took a stronger line on land reform. On the 
left, communist and radical movements were gathering support; on the right, the rural poor 
were being drawn into religious or caste conflicts, often provoked by the landed elite as a 
way of suggesting that the solution to rural poverty lay anywhere but in tenure reform.
31
 
Jawarharlal Nehru, a rising figure in the Party, expressed his disappointment with the Nehru 
Report’s recommendations on property.32 Under his influence, the Party swung to the left and 
secured a dominant position in Indian politics following independence. 
These tensions between social change and stability continued to the convening of the 
Constituent Assembly, and after.
33
 Ultimately, the Indian Assembly expressed the economic 
and social aspirations of the newly independent nation in Part IV of the Constitution, entitled 
the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’. There are clear parallels with section 5 of the 1935 
Philippine Constitution, although there is no evidence that the Indian framers were aware of 
the Philippine provision. The Directive Principles require the State to secure a ‘social order in 
which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national 
life’.34 The State was also charged to ‘strive to minimize the inequalities in income, and 
endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst 
individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in 
different vocations.’ The Directive Principles did not specifically require land reform or 
redistribution; however, they required the State to ensure ‘that the ownership and control of 
                                                 
31
 DA Low, ‘Congress and Mass Contacts, 1936–37: Ideology, Interests, and Conflict over the Basis of Party 
Representation’ in R Sisson and S Wolpert (eds), Congress and Indian Nationalism: The Pre-Independence 
Phase (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988) 134. 
32
 S Bhattacharya, ‘Swaraj and the Kamgar: The India National Congress and the Bombay Working Class, 
1919–1931’ in Sisson and Wolpert, ibid, 223, 237. 
33
 Austin, Indian Constitution (n 27); Merillat (n 8). 
34
 Constitution of India, Art 38(1). 
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the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common 
good’35 and that the ‘operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment’.36 Many state governments had 
already begun to move on land reform, which immediately raised questions regarding the 
desirability of incorporating a right to property in the Constitution’s chapter on fundamental 
rights.  
The central issue in the Assembly concerned the amount of compensation (if any) to 
be provided for zamindars. As in the Philippines, the large landowners employed liberal 
arguments to protect their position. After lengthy debate, the Indian Assembly settled on a 
right to property that would leave the legislature the freedom to determine compensation. As 
originally enacted, Article 31 of the Constitution provided as follows: 
(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. 
(2)  No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company 
owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for 
public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, 
unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and 
either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principle on which, and the 
manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given. 
These provisions were very similar to those of the Government of India Act, 1935. 
Ironically, provisions that were originally intended to protect the landowners were now 
employed to protect legislative power.
37
 However, in the independence Constitution, it would 
be the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, who would give assent to 
legislation. Under the Government of India Act 1935, the Governor General was not 
responsible to the Indian provincial legislatures, and it was expected that he would exercise 
his discretion in favour of the landowners. In the independence Constitution, the combination 
                                                 
35
 Constitution of India, Art 39(b). 
36
 Constitution of India, Art 39(c). 
37
 See Government of India Act, s 299(1) and (2); Art 31(3) was similar to s 299(3), except that the President 
held the power of approval previously held by the Governor General. 
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of Article 31 and responsible government meant that the provisions were seen as sufficiently 
open to allow state legislatures to pursue land reform without full compensation. Nehru stated 
that ‘Eminent lawyers have told us that on a proper construction of this clause, normally 
speaking, the Judiciary should not and does not come in’.38 The courts would become 
involved only where ‘there has been a gross abuse of the law, where, in fact, there has been a 
fraud on the Constitution’.39  
In summary, the constitutional position on property in India differed greatly from that 
in the Philippines.
40
 Politically, the rural peasantry were better able to command attention in 
India. Moreover, the educated urban classes that dominated the Congress Party leadership 
were relatively independent: their power did not depend on the landed elite, the former 
colonial power or foreign investors. Moreover, the Party itself was not ideologically bound to 
a specific position on economics and property. The liberal values of individual autonomy and 
equality were certainly important, especially as they challenged the systems of colonial and 
caste privilege that had held back many Congress members. However, social democracy and 
socialism were also attractive: a strong public sector, run by Indians, offered prospects for 
advancement that had not been available during the colonial period. By contrast, in the 
Philippines, the United States, as colonial power, held a veto over constitutional proposals; 
whilst it allowed the introduction of section 5, it also insisted on the retention of the takings 
clause.
41
 In any case, the peasantry lacked the organisation and influence to counterbalance 
the power of the landed elite over national politics. Consequently, property was not subject to 
the same kind of challenge as seen in India.   
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 Constituent Assembly Debates, vol IX, p 31, 10 Sept 1949. 
39
 ibid.  
40
 See Austin, 1966 (n 27), for a general review. 
41
 Putzel (n 2) 43–66; Wolters (n 11); Riedinger (n 11). 
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Despite these differences, there was an important common feature: neither group of 
framers found a way to integrate social justice with a right to property. In India, the initial 
solution was, in essence, to take questions relating to both social justice and property away 
from the courts, as neither the Directive Principles nor compensation were justiciable. In the 
Philippines, the opposite route was taken: both compensation and social justice were 
justiciable. In essence, the framers of both constitutions were aware of, and drew on, the 
international debates on liberalism, social democracy and socialism, as well as their own 
national values. However, as subsequent events would show, they struggled in their effort to 
pull them together in a coherent structure.  
III. Judicial Interpretation of the Property Clauses after Independence 
After achieving independence, both countries pursued land reform and redistribution, with 
varying degrees of commitment and success. The territorial government did attempt to break 
up concentrations of land ownership; however, it worked on the principle of full 
compensation, and the cost soon put the programme beyond the government’s financial 
capacity.
42
 The possibility of reducing compensation was then put beyond reach by the 
Supreme Court: in 1915, in Manila Railroad Company v Velasquez, Allarey and Maligalig, 
the Court held that ‘There is no question but that the compensation to which a defendant 
owner is entitled is the market value of the condemned property’.43 Arguably, the addition of 
section 5 in the 1935 Constitution, with its emphasis on the promotion of social justice, 
invited a re-examination of the meaning of ‘just’ compensation in cases of land reform. This 
was tested after World War II, in relation to Commonwealth Act No 539 (1940), which 
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allowed the President to acquire large estates for subdivision and transfer to tenants. In line 
with the takings clause, full compensation was paid to the owners. However, in a post-War 
case on Act No 539, Republic of the Philippines v Gonzales,
 44
 the Supreme Court suggested 
that ‘just’ compensation may require more than full compensation in redistribution cases, 
because the purpose was primarily private. Unlike a taking for a public amenity, the owner 
would not benefit from the subsequent use of the land. There was no re-examination in the 
light of section 5 and no consideration of the intended social impact of the legislation. Not 
surprisingly, the Act had very little impact on land distribution.
45
 The Court may have left 
behind some of the Lochner era doctrine, but not the commitment to property nor the 
requirement for full compensation. It seemed that the constitutional provisions on social 
justice would have no impact on the rights of landlords. 
This was confirmed with subsequent programmes. The Land Reform Act of 1955 
only applied to only a small proportion of agricultural land, with less than 0.4 per cent of 
farmland redistributed in the six years following its enactment.
46
 Another attempt at 
redistribution was launched with the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, but it also 
suffered from limited scope and ineffective implementation.
47
 The Supreme Court avoided 
political controversy: as noted above, Republic of the Philippines v Gonzales favoured the 
landowners, but the lack of political will over redistribution was more important in practice. 
Indeed, the peasant movements gained strength in the post-World War II period but, 
crucially, police and military action became more important than land reform in suppressing 
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rebellion. This was supported by the United States, which was now turning away from the 
policy of encouragement that it pursued in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.
48
  
In India, as the states began to abolish the zamindar system, the constitutional 
structure of property and social justice came under judicial examination. Some state courts 
held that the Constitution did not allow the amount of compensation to be scaled to the size 
or nature of the holding, as land reform legislation in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea had 
done.
49
 Parliament then enacted the First Amendment to the Constitution, which insulated 
land reform legislation from review under the provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights.
50
 
This should have resolved the controversy, but the Court held, in State of West Bengal v Bela 
Banerjee, that Article 31(2) sets a ‘basic requirement of full indemnification of the 
expropriated owner’.51 Legislation ‘must ensure that what is determined as payable must be 
compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of’.52 Separately, 
it indicated that the exclusions granted by the First Amendment would be narrowly 
construed.
53
 Parliament then sought to reverse Bela Banerjee by the Fourth Amendment 
(1955), which altered Article 31.
54
 However, the Supreme Court interpreted the amended 
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provisions so as to reinstate the guarantee of full compensation.
55
 Further amendments 
followed; in each case, the Supreme Court would reinstate the compensation guarantee 
through increasingly strained interpretation of the amended provisions.
 56
  
The conflicting views between Parliament and the Supreme Court over the 
compensation issue became increasingly important in political life. In the 1971 election 
campaign, Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party blamed the Court for the lack of progress on 
land reform.
57
 However, it is difficult to judge the real impact of the Court’s defence of 
property on redistribution. The exclusions of the First Amendment allowed the abolition of 
the zamindar system to proceed, and it was largely complete by 1960.
58
 However, a second 
phase of reform was intended to impose ceilings on holdings and redistribute the surplus to 
tenants. Very little progress was made from this point, but it seems that political forces were 
more important than judicial decisions in thwarting land redistribution. Landowners had 
become more adept at exerting influence through local political institutions. As Chibber puts 
it:  
The very institutions that were supposed to implement government policy — the Congress 
party machine and the local state organizations — were thoroughly penetrated by groups 
hostile to agrarian policy. Even the halting attempts at reform tried by Nehru foundered 
against their resistance.
59  
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Against this background, the immediate effect of the Supreme Court’s judgments may 
have been marginal. At most, the Court merely provided another mechanism for the landed 
elite to protect its interests.  
As the highest courts began to develop their jurisprudence on property, a common 
trend emerged. In both countries, the early post-independence judgments were characterised 
by lack of engagement with social justice and indeed with local conditions. Comparative law 
was part of this. In the Philippines, the Supreme Court treated American law as though it 
were binding. Consequently, there was no room to bring section 5 into the interpretation of 
‘just compensation’, or indeed any other cases, as it had no American counterpart. In India, 
the leading cases reveal very little interest in local conditions and the reasons for land reform. 
In some of the leading cases, such as Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v The Sholapur 
Spinning and Weaving Co, American authorities were cited on almost every point by all of 
the judges.
60
 In the early cases, the judges did not seek to place the right to property within a 
specifically Indian context.
61
 Indeed, in both countries, the highest courts situated the 
constitutional protection of property within an international context that transcended national 
politics. Why the judges did so is unclear: it may have been that the international, 
comparative approach provided a kind of credibility or legitimacy to politically contentious 
decisions in favour of landowners. There was no reference to international sources that might 
have led the judges to allow land reform programmes to proceed.  Social democrat ideas 
seemed to have little influence on the courts, whether in the form of the social justice 
provisions of each constitution or in the broader international conceptions of human rights 
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that underpinned those provisions. Arguably, there was a kind of globalism in evidence, but 
more in the form of an internal body looking to global values (and only one set of values) to 
bolster its domestic position. 
IV. The (Temporary) Decline of Liberalism  
If the 1950s and 1960s were the high point of the liberal ideology of the property in the 
courts, the 1970s and 1980s represent its weakest point. By the 1970s, the liberal model of 
constitutions and property had become increasingly out of touch with changing international 
developments. The rise of the non-aligned movement and the adoption of the New 
International Economic Order were the global movements of importance, and this was 
reflected in the national debate on property. In India, the Janata Government brought the 
Forty-Fourth Amendment through Parliament in 1978. It was intended to resolve issues over 
compensation, as it deleted the right to property from the list of fundamental rights. A new 
right to property was enacted as Article 300A.
 62
 However, as it stated only that ‘No person 
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law’,63 it appeared that there was no 
guarantee of compensation; more generally, there seemed to be no scope for judicial review 
of legislation that authorised takings. Instead, it seemed that property owners were only 
protected from unlawful administrative action.
64
  
After the Forty-Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court retreated from its earlier 
dogmatism on compensation.  For example, in a case on old right to property, Iyer J stated 
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that 'short of paying a “farthing for a fortune” the question of compensation is out of bounds 
for the court to investigate’.65 Property could be taken ‘not for a return, but for almost free, if 
the justice of the situation commended itself to the legislation to take it that way.’66 He 
dismissed a separate argument based on the right to equality (that is, that the owner of 
extensive landholdings should be compensated at the same rate per acre as a smallholder), 
asking ‘Which is more basic? Eradication of die-hard, deadly and pervasive penury degrading 
all human rights or upholding of the legal luxury of perfect symmetry and absolute equality 
attractively presented to preserve the status quo ante?’67 Iyer J came close to ridiculing the 
Court’s earlier position for ignoring the realities of Indian life. Moreover, by casting human 
rights in terms of human dignity in the face of poverty and economic uncertainty, he 
challenged the Court’s earlier liberal tendency to narrow the focus of justice on the specific 
harm to the owner, without consideration of the broader social context of ownership.  
In the Philippines, the Supreme Court also retreated from its earlier position.  After 
declaring martial law in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos adopted populist policies on land reform. 
Presidential Decree No 27 imposed an upper ceiling on land ownership and declared that 
tenants would be deemed to own the land that they cultivated. Landlords would be 
compensated at a rate of two-and-a-half times the value of the average annual yield. This 
formula was borrowed from the Taiwan land reform programme of the post-War period.
68
 It 
would not have withstood scrutiny under the interpretation of the takings clause seen in cases 
such as Manila Railroad Company v Velasquez, Allarey and Maligalig and Republic of the 
Philippines v Gonzales. However, along with the due process and takings clauses, the 1973 
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Constitution also included a declaration that all decrees issued by the President were valid 
law.
69
 Implicitly, the doctrine on full compensation was no longer good law, at least in 
respect of takings under Presidential Decree No 27. The Constitution also added to the 
provisions on social justice, with the following: 
The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the 
people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, 
and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. And  
The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating 
the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this 
Constitution.
70
 
In Chavez v Zobel,
71
 the Court upheld the provisions of Presidential Decree No 27 
deeming the tenants to be owners and in Association of Rice and Corn Producers v National 
Land Reform Council, it upheld the principle that ‘just compensation’ did not necessarily 
equate with full market value compensation.
72
 The case did not turn on the 1973 provisions, 
but Fernando J remarked of section 5 of the 1935 Constitution that ‘[i]ts philosophy is a 
repudiation of laissez-faire’.73  
In both India and the Philippines, constitutional law of the 1970s and 1980s followed 
the international trend of the 1960s and 1970s in favour of greater state control over natural 
resources in the developing nations. Whilst the international statements such as the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) were aimed more at foreign ownership of resources 
than internal concentrations of property, they did challenge the principle of full compensation 
for all takings. Indeed, scepticism over the value of entrenching the judicial protection of 
property rights was also seen outside the developing world. For example, in the early 1980s, 
Canada rejected economic and property rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights had not yet begun its expansion 
of the right to property that would continue to the present day,
 74
 and there were no signs that 
the socialist nations of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Asia would move toward 
market economies. Hence, to some extent, the judicial relaxation of the constitutional 
standards in India and the Philippines in the 1980s was consistent with global developments. 
However, by the time the courts in India and the Philippines had accepted the shift away from 
the guarantees of full compensation, the liberal ‘Washington Consensus’ was gaining force 
externally and their governments had largely abandoned any commitment to internal land 
reforms. By the end of the decade, the international trend would shift back to bring pressure 
on governments to incorporate compensation guarantees at national level.  
V. Revival of the Liberal Right to Property 
The weakening of the right to property did not last long in either country; moreover, it did not 
contribute to greater progress on redistribution. In the Philippines, Presidential Decree No 27 
did not have a significant impact. This was partly due to its limited scope, as it only applied 
to rice and corn lands, thereby omitting the large sugar plantations. In any case, 
implementation was marred by extensive corruption, as Marcos often targeted the land of his 
political opponents for expropriation and redistribution.
75
 By the 1986 revolution, 
dissatisfaction over land reform helped to bring together the rural poor and the landed elite in 
a loose anti-Marcos alliance. For the poor, the Marcos regime represented a failure to honour 
promises of redistribution; for the landowners, Presidential Decree No 27 was part of a 
                                                 
74
 See T Allen, ‘Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1055. 
75
 Putzel (n 2) 137–43; Riedinger (n 11). 
24 
 
general breakdown of a constitutional order that had protected their interests. Both groups 
had an interest in finding a new constitutional settlement on land reform.
76
  
As the negotiations went forward, it became clear that the liberal vision of property 
would be restored. At an early stage, the Committee on Social Justice proposed ‘a fair and 
progressive system of compensation’, with payment of a lower proportion of market value for 
larger estates. The Constitutional Commission, dominated by the landed interests, overruled 
the Committee and made the land reform provisions subject to the ‘just compensation’ 
standard of the takings clause.
77
 As explained above, the Supreme Court had interpreted the 
clause so as to allow below-market compensation in Association of Rice and Corn Producers 
v National Land Reform Council. However, following the revolution, it restored the market 
standard as the measure of ‘just compensation’, even in respect of Presidential Decree No 27. 
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v Hon Secretary of Agrarian Reform
78
 
the Court stated that  
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its 
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not 
the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to intensify the meaning of the 
word ‘compensation’ to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to 
be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
79
 
The Supreme Court not only restored the earlier doctrine, but also the emphasis on 
American law. This passage is taken from a 1915 authority, City of Manila v Estrada and 
Estrada, which in turn takes it from Virginia and Truckee R R Co v Henry, a nineteenth 
century Nevada state court judgment.
80
 City of Manila v Estrada and Estrada and Virginia 
and Truckee R R Co v Henry concerned takings by private railway companies under 
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delegated powers of eminent domain. The Court in Philippines v Hon Secretary of Agrarian 
Reform did not consider whether such cases provide a useful guide to land redistribution. 
Indeed, the Court made numerous approving references to social justice and land reform, but 
none to the potential impact of full compensation on the cost and prospects for 
implementation.  
The 1986 Constitution also included new provisions on social justice. Section 6 of 
Article XII, ‘National Economy and Patrimony’, included a provision on the social 
conception of ownership:  
The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the 
common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and 
similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic 
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene 
when the common good so demands. 
Section 1 of Article XIII, on ‘Social Justice and Human Rights’, directs Congress to  
give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the 
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove 
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. 
Sections 4 to 10 lay out detailed principles on agrarian and urban land reform, 
including a specific right ‘of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own 
directly or collectively the lands they till’.  
These provisions are stronger than the provisions of the 1973 Constitution that the 
Court relied on in Association of Rice and Corn Producers v National Land Reform Council, 
where it held that social justice could allow for a departure from a strict reading of ‘just 
compensation’ standard.81 However, the post-revolutionary conception of social justice 
turned back to liberal, individualist conceptions of justice. The following statement by Mr 
Justice Isagani Cruz, made as a member of the 1986 Constitution Commission, has been 
quoted in a number of cases:   
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social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving, whether he be a 
millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, 
we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly 
extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply 
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must 
always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
82
  
Following this approach, the Court has rejected the argument that the nature and 
importance of agrarian reform, and its separate treatment in the Constitution, justifies an 
exceptional approach.
83
  In Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc v Land Bank of 
the Philippines,
 it stated that ‘nothing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land 
reform and the right of landowners to receive just compensation for the expropriation by the 
State of their properties’.84  Any tension between the rights of property and the rights of the 
tenants must be resolved in favour of the landowner: ‘That the petitioners are corporations 
that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken against them’.85  
Apo Fruits examined the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
86
 which was 
enacted in 1988. As Apo Fruits, Association of Small Landowners v Secretary of Agrarian 
Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines v Honeycomb Farm confirm, the guarantee of full 
compensation to all owners lies at its core. The land is bought by a government agency for 
resale to tenants at an affordable price, with the State expected to absorb the difference (as 
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well as all other costs). In this respect, there is no change from the previous land 
redistribution schemes, as the cost of the programme quickly exceeded the capacity of the 
public treasury. It is worth noting, however, that section 17 of the legislation states that ‘just 
compensation’ should include consideration of ‘The social and economic benefits contributed 
by the farmers and the farmworkers’. However, the administrative agency charged with 
implementing the law has set a valuation formula that does not appear to take this into 
account,
87
 and the Supreme Court has upheld its approach.
88
  
A further point concerns control over the large estates. Section 4, Article XIII of the 
Constitution requires the State to ‘undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right 
of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands 
they till’. Section 31 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program then stated that 
landowners could transfer their estates to corporations, which would then distribute stock to 
farm workers. This, it was argued, would satisfy the Constitution, although the workers 
would own shares rather than the land itself. Moreover, the law allows the holding company 
to limit the workers’ aggregate share in the company to the proportion of agricultural land 
held by the company.
 89
 Hence, in the case of Hacienda Luisita, Inc v Presidential Agrarian 
Reform Council,
90
 the company argued that the agricultural land only constituted about one-
third of the value of its assets, with the result that the tenants collectively would not have a 
controlling share in the company. The Supreme Court upheld this arrangement, although it 
appears contrary to the principle of direct peasant ownership. Together, the enactment of the 
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1987 Constitution and its interpretation by the Supreme Court has reinstated the liberal 
compensation guarantees of the earlier period. Once again, the social justice provisions have 
been given very little real significance. Moreover, as it did in the pre-Marcos era, the Court 
has justified its position by reference to the American constitutional law. Indeed, American 
cases are cited as though there is no distinction between American and Philippine law. Not 
only does this apply to compensation, but in the leading case on regulatory takings, the 
Supreme Court cited more American cases than Philippine cases (and the Philippine cases 
that were cited themselves relied on American authorities).
91
 
In India, the conflict over compensation and property subsided after the Forty-Fourth 
Amendment. This was largely due to the declining importance of land redistribution in Indian 
politics: unlike the Philippines, no significant programmes for redistribution were announced 
in the 1980s or after. This is not to say that redistribution did not continue in some States: 
indeed, cases are still reaching the Supreme Court on the scope and application of land 
reform legislation that was first enacted in the 1960s or 1970s.
92
 Moreover, by the mid-1990s, 
the Supreme Court began to revive the constitutional standards of the earlier period. It first 
focused on the guarantee in Article 14 against arbitrary state action. In State of Tamil Nadu v 
Ananthi Ammal, on the acquisition of land for Harijan housing sites, the Court held that 
statutory provisions for the payment of compensation by instalment were contrary to Article 
14 because they were ‘unreasonable’ (no further explanation was offered). 93 Subsequently, 
the Court developed a right to compensation under Article 300A. As explained above, Article 
300A appears to provide only procedural safeguards in respect of takings. However, in the 
leading case KT Plantation Pvt Ltd v State of Karnataka, the Court stated that although 
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Article 300A ‘enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law’, it was also 
the case that a ‘limitation or restriction [on property] should not be arbitrary or excessive or 
what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be 
disproportionate to the situation or excessive’.94 In practice, a taking of property is ‘arbitrary’, 
‘excessive’, or ‘disproportionate’ if compensation is not paid.  
The Supreme Court of India has therefore followed a similar path to its Philippine 
counterpart, in reinstating a right to compensation. However, in KT Plantation, the Court 
stated that the legislature has some flexibility to adapt compensation standards to the context. 
The Court did not elaborate, except to say that:  
Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such 
a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. … in 
each case, the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether 
payment of nil compensation or nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust, 
unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above.
95
   
Although the Indian law allows greater latitude to the legislature than in the 
Philippines, there is another significant point of similarity. In KT Plantation, the Court again 
returned to comparative law to justify its position, just as the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines did in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v Hon Secretary of 
Agrarian Reform. However, the Indian Court began to look to other comparative sources. In 
particular, it borrowed from the doctrine on the right to property contained in the First 
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. As drafted, the Protocol did not 
guarantee compensation; however, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted it so 
as to require compensation in most cases. In the leading cases Sporrong and Lönnroth v 
Sweden,
96
 James v United Kingdom
97
 and Lithgow v United Kingdom,
98
 the Court of Human 
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Rights held that the Protocol requires States to strike a ‘fair balance’ between private and 
public interests. From this, it concluded that ‘the taking of property without payment of an 
amount reasonably related to its value would normally constitute a disproportionate 
interference which could not be considered justifiable’ under the Protocol99  There is some 
flexibility in cases of social or economic justice: in James v UK, the Court held that 
legislation giving residential tenants on long leases the right to buy the freehold at below-
market rates did not violate the Convention, on the basis that 
Legitimate objectives of ‘public interest’, such as pursued in measures of economic reform or 
measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of 
the full market value.
100
 
In KT Plantation, the Supreme Court briefly referred to the European right to 
property, although not specifically in relation to the standard for compensation.
101
 However, 
the language employed by the Supreme Court is so close to that of James v UK that it seems 
likely that it borrowed directly from the European judgments. The Court also referred to 
constitutional principles from the United States, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, as well as the historic writers Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Rousseau and 
Blackstone, to demonstrate that some form of compensation requirement is universal amongst 
the nations that adhere to the rule of law.
102
   
In terms of the rhetoric, the Court has restored the post-independence approach. In 
terms of doctrine, there are some differences. In particular, it seems that Indian law now 
accommodates the flexibility of some European constitutions and European human rights 
law. However, it is worth noting that the European Court of Human Rights has itself begun to 
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restrict legislative discretion in areas of social justice.
103
 The Court is settling on the liberal 
view that the burden for alleviating poverty and achieving social justice is borne solely by the 
State. In principle, this view allows exceptions to the general rule of full compensation, but 
increasingly the exceptions arise only where there are specific concerns over the conduct of 
the owner in acquiring property.
104
 This is much narrower than a general conception of social 
obligation, and significantly closer to the liberal vision of property and the constitution. 
Whether the Supreme Court in KT Plantation was aware of this trend is not clear, but it does 
suggest that the Indian law will retain its liberal focus.  
VI. Globalism, Comparative Law and the Right to Property 
Judgments on property and compensation in the Philippines and India are regularly justified 
by reference to American and European authorities. It is easy to understand why the courts 
did so in their early periods, especially in the Philippines: American judges sat on its 
Supreme Court, and interpreted clauses taken from the Bill of Rights of the United States. 
However, by now, one might have expected the Philippine Court to have developed its own 
jurisprudence on property and the constitution. One might have expected that, if American 
cases are cited, there would be a clear sense of the purpose for doing so, the weight to be 
given to them, and how they help (or hinder) the understanding of the issues. This has not 
been the case, however.  
The situation in India is similar. Whilst the use of comparative law by the Supreme 
Court across all cases has declined since independence,
105
 it remains important in property 
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cases. The Supreme Court has been more willing to look beyond American authorities, but 
there is very little discussion of comparative methodology. Neither court considers the 
relevance of the broader context of comparative analysis. American sources are frequently 
cited, and yet none of the American states have engaged in land redistribution on anything 
like the scale attempted in India or the Philippines. The provisions on social justice in the 
constitutions of India and the Philippines have no counterpart in the United States, yet it 
seems that the courts in India and the Philippines see no need to examine national differences 
or the context in which takings occur and constitutional principles evolve. Constitutional 
models that integrate ideas of social obligation, public power and individual autonomy within 
a right to property are rarely cited; even when they are cited, as in KT Plantation, there is no 
discussion of the differences in approach.
106
 In KT Plantation, the Court even acknowledged 
that the constitutional systems of Canada and the United Kingdom do not provide a 
justiciable right to property, but without explaining how its consideration of these systems 
affected its analysis of Indian law.
107
  
The superficiality of the analysis leads to the question: what purpose does 
comparative law serve? An earlier generation of comparativists argued that comparative law 
provides an opportunity to improve domestic law, on the basis that the analysis of laws of 
different systems on a specific issue helps to identify the best solution to a legal problem.
108
 
However, whatever the merits and limitations of this approach may be, especially in the 
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judicial context, it has not been the purpose of using comparative law in either country. At 
best, the use of comparative law is observational rather than analytical, as the Philippine and 
Indian courts do little more than offer brief summaries of the law in other jurisdictions. No 
function for law is identified, and there is no discussion of the operation of the law within the 
host system or its practical impact in serving that function. Indeed, where there are different 
approaches across the comparators, there is no attempt to determine a ‘best solution’ from 
amongst them.
109
 
An alternative view is held by those who argue that comparative law has little impact 
on legal change.
110
 Change in law, and specifically the convergence of law, is driven by 
structural forces that are beyond the control of lawmakers. For example, the prominence of 
land reform is likely to be affected by population movements and markets for labour and 
land. In recent years, it could be argued that the international convergence on a liberal right to 
property has been driven less by judicial borrowing than by global factors such as the decline 
of socialism and the increased flow of international capital into land. Internally, the framing 
and interpretation of a right to property may have involved a comparative analysis of 
different models, but it would be a mistake to treat the comparative analyses as the cause for 
the adoption of a right to property or indeed of a liberal right to property. Hence, in India and 
the Philippines, one might argue that the judicial discussion of comparative law shows that 
the courts have favoured the liberal model of a right to property, but it does not explain why 
they do so.  
Although these two models suggest that comparative law is either significant or 
irrelevant to legal change, the lack of any real functional analysis suggests that the conclusion 
is the same: comparative analysis has not been a driver for change. Comparative law in the 
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courts is, at most, evidence of choices made for other reasons. However, as Daniel Farber has 
shown, it may serve an important function in signalling those choices to relevant 
audiences.
111
 Indeed, the practice of citing without analysis suggests that comparative law 
does serve this function. To the courts, it seems that it is enough to show that a right to 
property is found in the constitutional systems of developed states. By itself, this does not 
seem especially compelling, but, as Adam M Smith points out, it appeals to specific 
aspirations in India: 
Foreign law and precedent come into judgments in the form of culturally persuasive (even if 
not legally relevant) support for a change that coheres with the judges’ views of the type of 
culture to which their state aspires.
112
 
In India, this may explain why many of the discussions of comparative law in the 
leading cases on property are more observational than analytical. As he notes, Indians have 
‘desperately wished to join’ the international, developed community.113 Hence, there is 
receptiveness to measures that help to place India within the international community of 
states that respect individual rights. Indeed, this has been a central aspiration of Indian 
national leaders from the drafting of the Nehru Report in 1928.
114
 Accordingly, if a right to 
property is found in the constitutions of liberal states that respect human rights, a similar right 
should be ‘found’ within the Indian system, if at all possible. This is certainly evident in KT 
Plantation: the purpose, language and intention underlying Article 300A do not provide room 
for the kind of guarantee constructed by the Court, unless one assumes that the compensation 
guarantees simply must exist somewhere within the Constitution.  
                                                 
111
 Farber (n 4). 
112
 Smith (n 105) 265. 
113
 ibid.  
114
 US Mehta, ‘Constitutionalism’ in NG Jayal and PB Mehta (eds), The Oxford Companion to Politics in India 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 16: Debates in the Constituent Assembly were characterised by an 
‘intense concern with India’s standing in the world’. 
35 
 
If comparative law is used as a form of signalling, who is the audience? Eyal 
Benvenisti has argued that, in some cases, it may be aimed at other national courts, as a 
means of co-ordinating responses to certain forces of globalisation.
115
 One example is 
environmental law: some national courts have challenged the failure of governments to 
control pollution, especially by powerful multinational actors. However, for this to work 
effectively, some degree of co-ordination between national courts is essential to avoid a ‘race 
to the bottom’. The citation of comparative law can be helpful in this regard:  
Courts that wish to signal readiness to cooperate [with courts of other countries] will tend to 
use the language that other courts understand: comparative law (primarily comparative 
constitutional law) and international law.
116
  
Benvenisti argues that this can be seen in Indian environmental cases.
117
 However, 
there is little evidence that has happened with the right to property. Indeed, as Part III shows, 
the weakest point in both countries for the protection of property came during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, when co-operation between governments in the developing world on the 
nationalisation of property was at its high point. The national courts in India and the 
Philippines in this period did not act as a counterbalance to their governments; rather, by 
weakening the protection of property, they tracked government policy. More recently, there 
has been a considerable level of concern over land grabs.
118
 National and local governments 
have often acquiesced in the displacement of vulnerable people. Arguably, there is room for 
transnational co-operation between courts along the lines suggested by Benvenisti, but it has 
not occurred in the property cases. 
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Arguably, any signalling through comparative law is aimed more at investors than the 
courts of other countries. Indeed, there is an extensive literature on the role of constitutional 
law in attracting investment. There is evidence that judges in both countries cite comparative 
law to assure investors that national standards are similar to international standards, and 
hence that there is no greater political risk to capital than elsewhere.
119
 In KT Plantation, the 
Indian Supreme Court not only cited numerous comparative examples, but explicitly 
acknowledged the importance of building investor confidence in its legal system.
120
 The 
choice of comparators also provides some evidence of this. The Philippine Supreme Court 
relies more on American legal authority than its Indian counterpart; arguably, this reflects the 
historic dependence of the Philippines on American investment and support. Moreover, 
neither court engages in any discussion of the law of other developing nations, or of nations 
that do not guarantee compensation for expropriation. Such comparators could provide more 
potential for judicial learning, but would not send the same signal to investors.  
Finally, at least some of the cases raise the suspicion that comparative law provides a 
claim for legitimacy for socially conservative policies. In particular, the language of liberal 
right to property, within a broader scheme of internationally recognised human rights, gives a 
privileged minority a credible case for maintaining their position. Comparative law in the 
courts almost invariably supports a liberal theory of property; one of the key features of the 
liberal theory that emerges from comparative law is its abstraction from the local context. For 
example, cases from both jurisdictions demonstrate that the courts have resisted arguments 
that land reform requires a different approach to compensation. It is, of course, difficult to 
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judge how far the courts participate in constitutional clientelism, as judges are unlikely to say 
that their decisions are guided by class loyalties rather than legal principle.
121
  
Of the two courts, it seems more likely that this is the case in the Philippines. Not 
only has constitutional interpretation favoured landed interests, but the statutory 
interpretation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program legislation has done so as 
well. At no point has it challenged the legislature in the ways seen in India. Hence, the 
citation of American constitutional law provides a convenient rhetoric to justify the limits on 
land reform, for audiences at home and abroad. The global aspect of comparative law lacks 
the local or even historical context that the opponents of agrarian reform do not wish to 
acknowledge. Indeed, it seems that that is its attraction: it shifts the focus outward and away 
from local conditions, and by doing so, it undermines the case for reform. In India, the picture 
is more complex because the Supreme Court accepted the constitutionality of the 
amendments that excluded judicial review from most land reform legislation. Nevertheless, 
the use of comparative law has allowed the Court to maintain the separation of the right to 
property from social justice, as it treats the ownership of land as a matter of private law. In 
effect, comparative law has restricted the vocabulary for debating agrarian reform, and the 
global, transnational nature of liberal property has indirectly legitimated the demands of the 
elite for constitutional protection. 
VII. Conclusion 
Governments in both India and the Philippines have made grand promises about agrarian 
reform and land redistribution at various points in their history. Both countries have achieved 
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some success, but the general picture is one of a series of failed plans. This paper has 
highlighted the judicial role in these successes and failures, especially in terms of the 
globalising aspect of the use of comparative law. With the exception of a brief period in the 
1970s and 1980s, the highest courts have taken a liberal position on redistribution and 
compensation. To be sure, there are differences between them: currently, the Indian Supreme 
Court is more flexible in terms of the standard for compensation and in the recognition of 
specific exclusions of judicial review than the Philippine court. The Indian court has also 
come into conflict with Parliament over constitutional interpretation and amendment, 
whereas the Philippine court’s relationship with governments and the legislature has been 
comparatively calm. Nevertheless, there is a striking similarity in their use of comparative 
law and its relationship with the liberal model of property. 
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